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Abstract 
This informational paper discusses the risk 
assessment process conducted to analyze Control 
and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) 
architectures for integrating civil Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace 
System (NAS).  The assessment employs the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Risk Management framework to identify 
threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these 
architectures and recommends corresponding 
mitigating security controls.  This process builds 
upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special 
Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk 
assessment methodology and to identify categories 
of information security risks that pose a 
significant impact to aeronautical communications 
systems. A description of the deviations from the 
typical process is described in regards to this 
aeronautical communications system. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the information, data resulting 
from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Introduction 
Overview 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) integration 
into the National Airspace System (NAS) represents 
many new challenges in aviation. One of the 
challenges is the development of a new command 
and control communication system capable of 
providing reliable, safe, secure, routine operation of 
an unmanned aircraft (UA). Additional challenges 
associated with the development of a new command 
and control communication system include the 
assignment of a dedicated frequency spectrum, the 
development of a communications datalink, and the 
security testing and certification of the 
communications system. RTCA Special Committee 
203 (SC 203) identified this new UAS command 
and control communication system as the Control 
and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC) system. 
The purpose of the CNPC system is to exchange 
information between the UA and the UAS Control 
Element (CE) to ensure safe, secure, and reliable 
communications. Figure 1 below shows the various 
elements that comprise the Unmanned Aircraft 
System [1]. The CNPC is part of the 
Communications Element. 
 
Figure 1. Unmanned Aircraft System 
Elements[1] 
The risk assessment was guided by federal 
standards, so as the CNPC system evolves the FAA 
could utilize this assessment as a contributing 
component of a final assessment and eventual 
CNPC system certification. The federal standards 
were authorized by The Federal Information 
Systems Management Act (FISMA). FISMA tasked 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) with the responsibility for developing 
standards that provide security of federal 
information systems. The standards shall include 
information security standards necessary to improve 
the security of federal information systems. The risk 
assessment contains the results of a security risk 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140009570 2019-08-31T20:32:46+00:00Z
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assessment conducted on a notional CNPC system 
supporting the operations of UAS in the NAS. The 
risk assessment followed the guidelines found in the 
NIST Special Publication 800-30 (July 2002) Risk 
Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems [2] and NIST Special Publication 800-53 
(Revision 3 August 2009) Recommended Security 
Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organizations [3].  This assessment process builds 
upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special 
Committee (SC) 203 to define candidate 
architectures and its ad-hoc security sub-group to 
suggest following a NIST-based risk assessment 
methodology [4].  We concur with [4] that a NIST-
based risk assessment methodology was the most 
logical choice to follow as: 
• NIST standards and guidelines are 
developed from commercial best 
practices. 
• While NIST standards are required for all 
government systems, they are free for the 
private sector to use. 
• The FAA’s Security Certification and 
Authorization Package (SCAP) already 
implements the NIST standards and 
guidelines.  
Purpose 
The risk assessment identified the threats, 
vulnerabilities, inherent risks, and the controls that 
may be used to mitigate the risks encountered in a 
notional CNPC system. It provides a basis in which 
core architectures, standards, and technologies may 
be evaluated in a consistent manner in regard to 
security. The risk assessment process provided a 
thorough qualitative and quantitative evaluation of 
threat-sources, vulnerabilities, risks, and controls 
associated with both our conceptual, as well as 
envisioned future, CNPC systems. Due to the 
sensitive nature of this information, data resulting 
from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Although the details of a specific, final 
implementation may differ in some aspects, the 
effort allows for the selection, evaluation, and 
verification of a substantial portion of the security 
components anticipated in those future CNPC 
systems. The format and content of the risk 
assessment may be used as the foundation for risk 
assessments by system implementers, certifying 
authorities or agencies when the final CNPC 
systems are constructed.  
 
Figure 2. Risk Assessment Methodology 
Flowchart [2] 
Figure 2 shows the common Risk Assessment 
Methodology as documented in NIST SP 800-30 
[2].  It became apparent in the early stages of this 
effort that an operational, or even early-
development, model of a system architected and 
built for certification under the future FAA and 
RTCA standards existed.  Several assumptions and 
a few process adjustments were necessary as we 
exercised the NIST framework. We also 
acknowledge that while we are aware of the many 
examples of public and military UAS operating by 
exception within the NAS, we did not feel these 
provided a suitable likeness for an analysis of how 
future civil UAS would be operated. Military CNPC 
systems are proprietary, rely on separate spectrum 
allocations, utilize cryptography not available for 
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civilian use, and details about the systems are 
largely unavailable to the general public.  
Methodology 
System Characterization 
Scope 
The development of civil UAS routinely flying 
in the NAS is still in its early stages. No civil UAs 
are routinely flying in the NAS at present. The UAs 
that are flying in the NAS are primarily military, 
federal government, test and development aircraft 
owned by private companies, or universities flying 
under exception.  These UAS utilize either military 
or proprietary communications systems specifically 
tailored to their mission’s scope. No FAA 
authorized communication system for UAs 
currently exists, so the analysis conducted in the 
risk assessment process was based on a baseline 
architecture of a notional CNPC system. The 
architectures of these CNPC systems were derived 
from RTCA Inc.’s, SC-203 Issue Paper, UAS 
Control and Communications Architectures [5]  and 
European Aviation Safety Agency’s (EASA) 
Inception Report of the Preliminary Impact 
Assessment on the Safety of Communications for 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) [6]. The baseline 
architecture consists of a CNPC system utilizing 
wireless datalinks along with optional wired 
terrestrial components. It is assumed that a real-time 
computer operating system with a protocol specific 
to the UAS is used to generate the data 
communications necessary and that the data will be 
transmitted via wired and/or wireless systems. The 
CNPC system may be point-to-point, line of sight, 
or transmitted through a series of ground stations 
and/or satellite system. It is from this notional 
CNPC system that threats, vulnerabilities, 
likelihoods, impacts and risk were derived.  
The risk assessment identifies two baseline 
communications architectures, direct and 
networked, for supporting the CNPC system. These 
baseline architectures are designed for use in the 
study, development, and evaluation of the security 
controls needed to secure communications between 
the various types of unmanned aircraft (UA), the 
associated control element (CE), and the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) facilities. UAs are being developed 
in various sizes with different operating altitudes, 
airspeeds and communications requirements, each 
presenting unique demands on the communication 
architectures. A conceptual architecture attempts to 
reduce these various communications architectures 
into two baseline architectures from which a 
communications security risk assessment can be 
performed. 
Figure 3. UAS Direct Control and Non-Payload 
Communications (CNPC) Security Baseline 
Architecture 
The architecture displayed in Figure 3 shows a 
direct CNPC communications path between the CE 
and the UA for line of sight (LOS) communications 
or direct CNPC communications path between the 
CE and the UA via a satellite system for beyond 
line of sight (BLOS) operations. Redundant paths 
implementing both LOS and BLOS may also be 
used to enhance communications reliability and 
range. In this architecture, ATC/Air Traffic 
Services (ATS) communications may be relayed 
through the UA to the CE as part of the CNPC or 
direct to the CE via ground or non-UA airborne 
communications links. 
 
Figure 4. UAS Networked Control and Non-
Payload (CNPC) Security Baseline Architecture 
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Figure 5. Overall View of System Inputs and Outputs [7] 
 
The architecture shown in Figure 4 uses an 
aeronautical communication service provider 
network to supply the primary CNPC links between 
the CE and the UA. The communications service 
provider network may be supplied by a third party, 
the UA owner/company or the FAA and provides a 
network of communications services within a small 
to global geographic area. The details of these 
services are not defined here but are considered a 
potential service offering in the future to support 
LOS and BLOS CNPC communications on a large 
scale. Redundant paths from the FAA facilities and 
CE to/from the service provider network may be used 
to enhance the availability of the communications 
links. 
The CNPC system is a data link comprised of 
several functions needed for the safe operation of a 
UA. Several of the functions can be combined 
depending on the capabilities of the UA and or its 
operational function. The following functions make 
up the CNPC data link: Telecommand Data, 
Telemetry Data, Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) 
Data, Air Traffic Control (ATC) Voice Relay, Air 
Traffic Services (ATS) Data Relay, Target Data, 
Airborne Weather Data and Non-Payload Video Data 
for safety of flight. Figure 5 shows the expected 
normal Communications, Navigation, and 
Surveillance functions associated with the operation 
of an unmanned aircraft in the NAS [7]. The figure 
also shows the relationship of the data to the primary 
elements that comprise a UAS. The CNPC data link 
connects the UA to its CE and associated Air Traffic 
Services (ATS). Communications with the support 
element (SE) pertains to transport, maintenance and 
launch of the UA; it is not part of the CNPC. 
The risk assessment process includes evaluating 
the security of the CNPC and ATC/ATS information 
sent to and from: the UAS control element, the 
unmanned aircraft element, the FAA’s ATC/ATS 
facilities, and the satellite and/or network service 
providers. While securing the physical facilities 
associated with UAS operation is an important 
contributor to the overall security of the entire 
system, it was deemed outside the scope of the 
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current CNPC risk assessment. Since threats from the 
environment, utilities, and other natural or manmade 
sources are unique to specific system 
implementations and operating environments, they 
could not be properly evaluated as part of the 
notional CNPC architecture. As our focus was to 
concentrate on the expected technical aspects of the 
CNPC security, organizational policies and 
procedures that would enhance the security posture of 
a UAS were also considered outside the scope of the 
evaluation.  In a risk assessment of an operational 
system seeking certification from a governing 
authority, such as the FAA, we fully acknowledge 
that these aspects would play a crucial role in 
defining the system’s security architecture.  
Security Categorization 
Security categorization is the characterization of 
information systems and information types based on 
assessment of the potential impact that a loss of 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of such 
information and information types would have on 
organizational operations, organizational assets, or 
individuals [8].  
Security categorization of an information system 
begins with the identification of the parts 
(information types) that make up the system, 
continues by performing an analysis of the impact the 
loss of confidentially, integrity and availability has 
on the information types and ends with a “high-water 
mark” analysis of the information types upon the 
system as a whole. The highest impact on the 
information types becomes the impact for that 
information type on the information system.  This 
information is then used during the system’s risk 
analysis process to select the minimum security 
controls for the information system.  The security 
categorization process is described in the Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 199 
(FIPS PUB 199) and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), Special 
Publication 800-60.  
A security categorization was conducted on the 
notional CNPC information system described above 
and its individual functions (information types).  The 
information types identified for the categorization 
process are the seven functions of the CNPC system: 
Telecommand Data, Telemetry Data, Navigational 
Aids (NAVAIDS) Data, Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
Voice Relay, Air Traffic Services (ATS) Data Relay, 
Target Data, Airborne Weather Data and Non-
Payload Video Data. The impact of losing 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of each 
information type was evaluated. An impact of Low, 
Moderate, or High was assigned to the loss of 
confidentially, integrity and availability of each 
information type based on the definitions found in 
FIPS PUB 199. The highest impact value for 
confidentiality, integrity and availability then 
becomes the overall security categorization impact 
level for the information type. This process delivered 
an overall security categorization for each 
information type based on the formula below. 
SCinformation type = {(confidentiality, impact), 
(integrity, impact), (availability, impact)}  
Once the security categorization of the 
information types was completed, a security 
categorization for the overall CNPC information 
system was conducted. The security categorization 
for the CNPC system was determined by selecting 
the highest impact value for each information type. 
The highest impact value for confidentiality, integrity 
and availability then becomes the overall security 
categorization impact level for the CNPC information 
system. The generalized format for expressing the 
Security Categorization for the CNPC System is: 
SCCNPC System = {(confidentiality, impact), 
(integrity, impact), (availability, impact)} 
The resulting impact level from the security 
categorization of the CNPC system was then used to 
identify the appropriate baseline security controls 
needed to mitigate the risks identified during the risk 
analysis process. 
Risk Identification 
Risk is defined as the overall negative impact to 
the system when considering the probability that a 
vulnerability is exploited by a threat-source. 
The risk identification phase of the risk 
assessment is the process by which risks to the 
system are identified and prioritized so that system 
owners are able to make a determination on how to 
allocate resources to mitigate overall impact to the 
system. Risk identification involves identifying threat 
sources, system vulnerabilities, and determining the 
probability that a known vulnerability can be 
exploited by the threat-source based upon inherent 
system controls. 
6 
 
Threat Identification 
A threat is the potential for a particular threat-
source to successfully exercise a particular 
vulnerability [2]. A known threat-source does not 
present a risk when there is no vulnerability that can 
be exploited within the system.  
Threat-sources for a specific system are 
identified as any circumstance or event that can cause 
harm to the system. In assessing threat-sources, it is 
important to consider all threat-sources that can harm 
the system and its processing environment. During 
the assessment process, we investigated threats 
related to both a general information technology 
communications system and, more specifically, 
aeronautical communications systems. Using these 
threats as a baseline, we were able to extract a list of 
likely threat-sources that would impact our notional 
CNPC system. 
The threat statement produced from this step of 
the process was created to provide a description of 
the anticipated threat types that can cause an adverse 
effect on the system.  
Vulnerabilities 
A vulnerability is a weakness in the system that 
can be exploited either intentionally or accidentally. 
The goal of this step was to develop a list of the 
system vulnerabilities (flaws or weaknesses) that 
could be exploited by the potential threat-sources [2]. 
The identification of vulnerabilities can take many 
forms based on various types of risk assessments. For 
the purposes of this risk assessment, we compiled a 
list of common information technology (IT) and 
communications-related system vulnerabilities that 
applied to our notional UAS CNPC system. Once an 
actual system is under development, these 
vulnerabilities would need to be re-evaluated to 
reflect the configuration of the implemented 
operational system and the operating environment. 
Risks 
Risk is the likelihood that a threat-source 
exploits a vulnerability and that it in turn results in an 
adverse impact to the system.  
The risk analysis for each vulnerability consists 
of assessing the threats and compensating controls to 
determine the likelihood that vulnerability could be 
exploited and the potential impact should the 
vulnerability be exploited. A general depiction of the 
analysis is shown in Figure 6, where risk is the 
intersection of a threat and vulnerability, influenced 
by likelihood and impact: 
 
Figure 6. Link between Likelihood, Impact, and 
Risk [2] 
Essentially, risk is proportional to both 
likelihood of exploitation and possible impact. 
Determination of threat and vulnerability pairing 
was accomplished by analyzing each vulnerability 
classification and applying a threat source to 
determine if the threat source pertained to the 
vulnerability. This iterative process of identifying 
relevant threat and vulnerability pairings resulted in 
the creation of a table of system risks.    
Control Analysis 
The goal of this step is to analyze the controls 
that have been implemented, or are planned for 
implementation, by the organization to minimize the 
adverse effect of the risk to the system. Security 
controls encompass the use of technical and non-
technical methods. Technical controls are safeguards 
that are incorporated into computer hardware, 
software, or firmware (e.g., access control 
mechanisms, identification and authentication 
mechanisms, encryption methods, intrusion detection 
software). Non-technical controls are management 
and operational controls such as security policies, 
operational procedures, and personnel, physical, and 
environmental security [2]. 
Security controls used for the risk assessment 
were defined in NIST Special Publication 800-53 
(Revision 3 August 2009) Recommended Security 
Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organizations [3]. 
For the purposes of the evaluation, given that the 
system is in a pre-development phase, we determined 
a list of likely applicable inherent system security 
controls that would be included in a commonly 
deployed system using commodity equipment and 
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software. For example, basic account management 
functionality is an inherent security control found in 
all modern operating systems that would likely be 
deployed for use in a UAS CNPC system. 
Likelihood Determination 
Likelihood is the probability that a given 
vulnerability will be exploited in a threat 
environment and is determined by analyzing the 
effectiveness of existing (in this case inherent) 
controls against the threat-source’s capability and 
motivation as well as the nature of the vulnerability. 
Existing controls consist of safeguards in place that 
effectively reduce the access to, or successful 
execution of, a given vulnerability by a threat-source. 
While determining threat source motivation is 
somewhat subjective, this is only one part of the 
"likelihood determination". 
Table 1. Likelihood Definitions [2] 
Likelihood Likelihood Definition 
High The threat-source is highly motivated and 
sufficiently capable, and controls to 
prevent the vulnerability from being 
exercised are ineffective. 
Medium The threat-source is motivate and capable, 
but controls are in place that may impede 
the successful exercise of the vulnerability. 
Low The threat-source lacks motivation or 
capability, or controls are in place to 
prevent, or at least significantly impede, 
the vulnerability from being exercised. 
 
Each documented risk was evaluated against the 
standardized definitions for each level, listed in Table 
1, and the most appropriate likelihood was selected.  
Numerical values for the likelihood are assigned 
based on the NIST SP 800-30 recommended 
approach, which is: High (1), Medium (.5), and Low 
(0.1). These values provide quantitative assignments 
of likelihood that are then utilized in the remaining 
steps to calculate the risk in a more precise manner 
than afforded by purely qualitative means. 
Impact Analysis 
Impact is the resulting effect if a given 
vulnerability is successfully exploited by a threat-
source. An impact to the system or data’s 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability is determined 
in accordance with the NIST SP 800-30 criteria and 
associated with the particular risk. The rationale for 
evaluating impact is that the exploit of a vulnerability 
with little or no adverse effects on the system or the 
data will typically result in a lower priority than 
vulnerabilities with higher adverse effects. 
Given that we were evaluating a notional 
system, we were still able to apply the standard 
impact definitions to our vulnerabilities. The impact 
definitions are not specific to any system design so 
we were able to correlate system impact to our threat-
vulnerability pairs. The impact analysis provides 
prioritization of risk and illuminates areas for 
immediate improvement of system vulnerabilities.  
Table 2. Impact Rating Definitions [2] 
Impact Impact Definition 
High Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the highly costly loss of major tangible assets 
or resources; (2) may significantly violate, 
harm, or impede an organization’s mission, 
reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in 
human death or serious injury. 
Medium Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the costly loss of tangible assets or resources; 
(2) may violate, harm, or impede an 
organization’s mission, reputation, or interest; 
or (3) may result in human injury. 
Low Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the loss of some tangible assets or resources or 
(2) may noticeably affect an organization’s 
mission, reputation, or interest. 
 
Each risk identified was evaluated against the 
standardized definitions for each level, listed in Table 
2, and the most appropriate impact selected. The 
results of this analysis provided both an impact level 
and rating value. The numerical values are assigned 
based on the NIST SP 800-30 recommended 
approach, which is: High (100), Medium (50), and 
Low (10). These values provided numerical 
assignment of impact that was utilized in future steps 
to calculate the risk in a more precise manner than 
afforded by qualitative means. 
Risk Determination 
Risk is a function of the likelihood of a given 
threat-source exercising a particular potential 
vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse 
event on the organization [2]. This section takes the 
qualitative threat-sources, vulnerabilities, and risks 
along with the quantitative likelihood and impact 
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values to derive a risk level associated with the 
notional CNPC system. Determining the risk level 
was accomplished by creating a matrix of the 
likelihood and impact values, shown in Table 3, to 
determine a risk rating for each individual risk. 
Table 3. Likelihood vs. Impact Matrix [2] 
Threat 
Likelihood 
Threat Impact 
Low 
(10) 
Medium 
(50) 
High 
(100) 
High 
(1.0) 
Low 
10x1.0=10 
Medium 
50x1.0=50 
High 
100x1.0=100 
Medium 
(0.5) 
Low 
10x0.5=5 
Medium 
50x0.5=25 
Medium 
100x0.5=50 
Low 
(0.1) 
Low 
10x0.1=1 
Low 
50x0.1=5 
Low 
100x0.1=10 
 
Creation of a rating scale for each individual risk 
allows for prioritization of effort during risk 
mitigation efforts. 
Control Recommendations 
In this section, controls that provide mitigation 
of the identified technical risks are suggested.  The 
assessment concentrated on selecting the NIST 
Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Revision 1 controls 
most likely to provide substantial reductions in the 
likelihood or impact of an identified risk beyond the 
inherent security controls found in the base system 
(or in this case technologies). The goal of the 
recommended controls was to reduce the residual risk 
level of the implemented system and its associated 
data to an acceptable level in order to gain 
accreditation by certifying authorities.  
Results Documentation 
The final step of the Risk Assessment 
Methodology involves the creation of the Risk 
Assessment Matrix, which brings together an 
executive view of all the previous steps into a final 
summary table. This compilation of information 
reveals to interested parties the threat-sources, 
vulnerabilities, inherent and recommended controls 
and assessed risk of the UAS CNPC system. 
Conclusion 
During this risk assessment we were able to 
successfully adapt the NIST SP 800-30 Risk 
Assessment Methodology to a notional UAS CNPC 
architecture in the very initial stages of development.  
To adapt the process to our needs we made certain 
assumptions regarding aspects of the system such as 
our hardware, software, communications architecture 
and interfaces, as well as drew upon information 
from similar IT and aeronautical communications 
systems to identify threats, vulnerabilities, risks, and 
inherent system controls that are likely to be present 
in civil UAS integrated into the NAS. 
The process allowed us to deliver a list of 
recommended security controls and enhancements for 
a representative architecture that is being fed into the 
follow-up work to develop a risk mitigation plan for 
the notional UAS CNPC system.  Current work 
involves developing a list of representative products 
and technologies that map against the recommended 
security controls identified during the risk assessment 
so that we can perform testing with those controls 
applied in a prototype architecture. 
Finally, we feel that UAS implementers in the 
future should be able to successfully utilize this NIST 
risk assessment process by adapting it to their 
particular system’s environment in order to assist in 
the certification and accreditation process with the 
FAA. 
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